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Abstract
We study the relative importance of intrinsic moral motivation and extrin-
sic social motivation in explaining behavior in the dictator game. We introduce
a novel design that manipulates these two dimensions. The paper offers four
main findings. First, intrinsic moral motivation is of fundamental importance.
Second, extrinsic social motivation matters and is crowding-in with intrinsic
moral motivation. Third, extrinsic social motivation generates behavior con-
sistent with some participants being motivated by guilt and shame and others
by social esteem and pride. Fourth, sharing behavior in the dictator game is
strongly associated with charitable giving outside the lab and with political
preferences.
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A prominent idea in behavioral economics is that people are morally moti-
vated, and the introduction of moral preferences (Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler,
1986a,b) has generated important work in most fields of economics.1 The most in-
fluential piece of empirical evidence underlying this development has been the ob-
servation that in lab experiments people consistently give away a substantial share
of money in the dictator game. The dictator game was introduced by Forsythe,
Horowitz, Savin, and Sefton (1994), and since then more than a hundred dictator
games have been published from all parts of the world (Engel, 2011). A key feature
of the dictator game is that it rules out selfish reasons for sharing, and the most com-
mon interpretation of generosity in the dictator game has therefore been that people
are intrinsically morally motivated. A recent important literature (Dana, Cain, and
Dawes, 2006; Dana, Weber, and Kuang, 2007; Broberg, Ellingsen, and Johannes-
son, 2007; Andreoni and Bernheim, 2009; Lazear, Malmendier, and Weber, 2012),
however, has questioned this interpretation, arguing that in the dictator game people
may be motivated by the fact that their decision is observed by an anonymous recip-
ient: “Just knowing that one is the anonymous dictator that the receiver will think
badly of can be sufficient to compel giving” (Dana et al., 2006, p. 201). Thus, shar-
ing in the dictator game does not necessarily only reflect intrinsic moral motivation,
but may also be driven by extrinsic social motivation.2
To understand the underlying motivation of moral behavior is of crucial impor-
tance in order to provide better models of human decision-making, and the present
paper seeks to address this issue by studying the relative importance of intrinsic
1Some examples include: political economy of redistribution (Alesina and Angeletos, 2005),
bargaining (De Bruyn and Bolton, 2008), game theory (Rabin, 1993), public good provision (Fis-
chbacher and Ga¨chter, 2010), contracts (Fehr, Hart, and Zehnder, 2011), labor markets (Charness,
2004), general equilibrium theory (Dufwenberg, Heidhues, Kirchsteiger, Riedel, and Sobel, 2011),
development (Karlan, 2005), incentive theory (Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2008), and axiomatic
utility theory (Karni and Safra, 2002).
2The distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation has a long history in psychology
and sociology, and has more recently also been introduced in economics, see for example Frey and
Oberholzer-Gee (1997); Gneezy and Rustichini (2000); Be´nabou and Tirole (2003). In the economic
literature, the focus has been on the interaction between the individual’s intrinsic motivation to
perform a task for its own sake and the extrinsic motivation of doing the task to achieve an external
monetary reward. In the present study, the focus is on the interaction between the individual’s
intrinsic moral motivation to share because he or she considers it the morally right thing to do and
the extrinsic social motivation to share because it gives an external social reward.
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moral motivation and extrinsic social motivation in the dictator game. The key
feature of our experiment is that we introduce a novel treatment design that manip-
ulates these two dimensions of the distributive problem. In one treatment variation,
we manipulate the moral argument for sharing, in another we manipulate the infor-
mation given to the recipient about the context and the dictator’s decision.
We manipulate the moral argument for sharing by changing the conditions of
the recipient, where we focus on entitlements and needs, which have been sug-
gested to be the moral considerations that account for the largest fraction of giving
in the real world (Konow, 2010). In the baseline treatment, the recipient is a stu-
dent who has not contributed to the money that is to be distributed, whereas in two
other treatments we introduce an entitlement argument and a needs argument for
sharing, respectively. In the entitlement treatment, the recipient is a student who
has contributed to the same extent as the dictator; in the needs treatment, the re-
cipient is a poor microfinance client in a developing country. To study the role of
information, we implement these three treatments in a 3× 2 design, where in one
set of treatments the recipient is given complete information about the context and
decision made by the dictator (in the following referred to as treatments with com-
plete information), and in the other set of treatments is given no such information
(in the following referred to as treatments with no information). This design allows
us to study intrinsic moral motivation by comparing sharing behavior in the base-
line treatment to sharing behavior when there is a moral argument for sharing, and
to study extrinsic social motivation by comparing the treatments where the recipi-
ent is given complete information to the treatments where the recipient is given no
information. Furthermore, this design also allows us to study whether introducing
an extrinsic social motive for sharing is crowding-in or crowding-out the intrinsic
moral motivation.
After the dictators have decided how much to give away, but before this is re-
vealed to the recipients, the dictators are given the opportunity to switch to the other
information condition. Dictators in the complete information treatments can decide
that no information is given to the recipient, and dictators in the no information
treatments can decide that complete information is given to the recipient. Their
information choices allow us to explore in more detail the nature of the extrinsic
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social motivation. In particular, we can study whether the extrinsic social motiva-
tion for giving is consistent with participants being motivated by guilt and shame or
by social esteem and pride, where the crucial distinction between these two sources
of motivation in the present study is that guilt and shame generate disutility and so-
cial esteem and pride generate positive utility.3 The information choice also sheds
light on why some people actively seek to avoid sharing situations, which has been
observed both in the lab (Dana et al., 2006; Broberg et al., 2007; Lazear et al., 2012)
and in the field (DellaVigna, List, and Malmendier, 2012). In the last part of the ex-
periment, we collect background information and ask the participants to comment
on what motivated their decision, which adds to our understanding of the decision
making process underlying the observed behavior.
The paper offers four main findings. First, we provide evidence of intrinsic
moral motivation being of fundamental importance for the sharing behavior of the
participants. When there is no obvious moral argument for sharing, most partici-
pants do not give anything to the recipient, whereas they give away a substantial
share when we introduce a moral argument. The importance of the moral argument
is also reflected in the explanations made by the participants, where they emphasize
both entitlements and needs considerations. Second, we show that extrinsic social
motivation matters, and we identify a crowding-in effect in situations where there
is a moral argument for sharing. Third, we show that the participants are divided on
whether to give information or not to the recipients, which is consistent with some
participants being motivated by guilt and shame and others by social esteem and
pride. Fourth, we show that the sharing behavior in the dictator game is strongly
associated with self-reported charitable giving outside the lab and with political
preferences.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 1 presents the sample and
the experimental design. Section 2 provides an overview of the treatment effects
and relates them to the explanations provided by the participants, whereas Section 3
reports from a regression analysis. In Section 4, we show how the results from the
3This distinction is consistent with the models offered in the recent economic literature on extrin-
sic social motivation, see for example Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007); Ellingsen and Johannesson
(2008); Andreoni and Bernheim (2009); Ellingsen and Johannesson (2011), but clearly does not ex-
haust the differences investigated in this literature.
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second part of the experiment shed light on the nature of extrinsic social motiva-
tion, and in Section 5 we discuss related literature and how our findings relate to
charitable behavior in the field.
1 Sample and design
We recruited participants among students at the Norwegian School of Economics
(NHH), and 200 of them were randomly allocated to the role as dictator. In addition
to the dictators, there was an equal number of recipients who did not make any
decisions in the experiment, as we explain in more detail below.
We had seven sessions that each lasted about 40 minutes and took place on
the same day. Individuals were randomly allocated to treatments within sessions
and each subject participated in only one session. All dictators received a show-
up fee of 100 NOK (approximately 17.50 USD), in addition to what they earned
in the distribution phase of the experiment. The experiment was double blind, i.e.,
neither participants nor experimenters could associate decisions with particular par-
ticipants, and used a web-based interface.4
At the beginning of the experiment, all dictators were informed about the rules
of the game, and given a description of how the game would proceed.5 The ex-
periment consisted of three phases: a production phase, a distribution phase, and
a questionnaire phase. In the production phase the dictators were asked to work
for 15 minutes on a task consisting of ticking off numbers in a matrix. They were
told that they had completed the task when they had reached a threshold level of
correct responses, and all participants managed to do so. We did not say anything
in advance about payment for completing the task.
In the distribution phase, the dictators were randomly allocated into different
4Special care was taken so that the payment procedure ensured participant-experimenter
anonymity. At the end of the experiment the computer assigned a payment code to each of the
dictators, and a group of assistants, who were not present in the lab during the experiment, prepared
envelopes containing the payments corresponding to each payment code. The assistants also made
sure that it was impossible to identify the amount of money by simply looking at the envelope. After
bringing the envelopes to the lab, the assistants immediately left and the envelopes were handed out
in accordance with the payment codes.
5Instructions were given in Norwegian, see the appendix for an English translation.
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treatments. In the base treatment (T1), they were informed that they had earned
200 NOK ($35) for completing the production phase. They were also told that they
were matched with another student at NHH, randomly selected from the student
body member registry. The dictators were then asked to decide how to share their
earnings between themselves and this other person. They were informed that the
money would be sent to the other person, after the experiment, together with the
following letter explaining the context and the decision of the dictator: “You have
been selected to receive x NOK from an economic experiment conducted at the
Norwegian School of Economics (NHH). Your name has been randomly selected
among the students at NHH. In this experiment a participant, who is also a student
at NHH, has earned 200 NOK by performing a task. The participant was then
informed that he (or she) had been matched with another person, randomly selected
among the other students at NHH (i.e. you), and was asked to decide how much of
the 200 NOK he wanted to give to you. Before he made his choice, he was shown
a copy of this letter. He decided to give you x NOK, which is enclosed to this
letter. If the envelope does not contain any money, however, the participant decided
not to give you any of his earnings.” To ensure that the dictators could trust that
the transfer would actually take place if they decided to give away a share of the
money, they were informed (in all treatments) that after the experiment, they could
obtain an anonymous copy of the transaction from the accounting department as
verification.6
In the other treatments we manipulated two dimensions of the distributive prob-
lem. In the treatments T2-T3, we manipulated the moral argument for sharing;
in the treatments T1*-T3*, we manipulated the information given to the recipient
about the context and the dictator’s decision. In all other respects, the treatments
were identical. In particular, in all treatments the dictator had to decide how much,
out of 200 NOK, to transfer to a recipient.
In T2, we introduced an entitlement argument for sharing. We did so by letting
the recipient be another student at NHH who had also signed up for the experiment,
6The participants would then have to send an e-mail with their payment code to the accounting
department, which would verify that the transfer had taken place. 1 out of 200 dictators did request
a verification. The participants were also given the opportunity to provide anonymous comments on
the experiment. In these comments no one expressed any doubt about the transfers taking place.
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but who was randomly assigned the role as recipient and sent to a different room.
The recipients were asked to do the same task as the dictators, again without any
mentioning of payment for completing the task. When the recipients had completed
the task, they were paid the show-up fee and told that they had completed the ex-
periment. Each dictator in this treatment was matched with one such recipient, and
then told that each had earned 100 NOK by completing the task. The dictator was
also told that the recipient was not aware of this payment, but would be informed
by the letter that would accompany the money that the dictator decided to transfer
to the recipient.7 Thus, in contrast to T1, the recipient in T2 could be seen as having
the same entitlements as the dictator, a moral argument that could motivate sharing.
In T3, we introduced a needs argument for sharing. We did so by letting the
recipient be a client in the microfinance institution PRIDE Tanzania.8 Again, the
context of both the dictator and the recipient was explained in detail in the letter
that accompanied any money given away.9 Thus, in contrast to T1, the recipient in
7The wording of the letter to the recipient in treatment T2 was as follows: “You have been
selected to receive x NOK from an economic experiment conducted at the Norwegian School of
Economics (NHH). Your name has been randomly selected among the students in the room you
were sitting in during the experiment on Tuesday November 3. In this experiment a participant in
a different room, who is also a student at NHH, has earned 100 NOK by performing the same task
as you. The participant was then informed that he (or she) had been matched with another person,
randomly selected among the other students that participated in the experiment (i.e. you). He was
informed that you had completed the same task. He was also informed that you had earned the same
amount, 100 NOK, but that you had not been informed about this. We then asked him to decide how
much of the joint earnings of 200 NOK, he wanted to give to you. Before he made his choice, he
was shown a copy of this letter. He decided to give you x NOK, which is enclosed to this letter. If
the envelope does not contain any money, however, the participant decided not to give you any of
the money that the two of you had earned.”
8PRIDE Tanzania is the largest microfinance institution in Tanzania, with approximately 70 000
clients. The clients involved in the present study were all selected from a branch in Dar es Salaam.
Norway is one of the richest and Tanzania one of the poorest countries in the world, a fact that is well-
known by most Norwegians. GDP per capita is 47 times higher in Norway than Tanzania, see Table
6 in International Comparison Program (2008), and the Norwegian government and Norwegian
donors are extensively involved in aid work in Tanzania.For a more detailed discussion of the clients
and context of PRIDE Tanzania, see Berge, Bjorvatn, and Tungodden (2012).
9The wording of the letter to the recipient in treatment T3 was as follows: “You have been
selected to receive x NOK (equivalent to y USD) from an economic experiment conducted at the
Norwegian School of Economics (NHH) in Norway. Your name has been randomly selected among
the clients in the micro finance institution PRIDE TANZANIA in Dar es Salaam in Tanzania. In
this experiment a participant, who is a student at NHH, earned 200 NOK by performing a task. The
participant was then informed that he (or she) had been matched with another person, randomly
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T3 could be seen as having greater need for the money, also a moral argument that
could motivate sharing.
The second treatment variation manipulated the information given to the recipi-
ent. The treatments T1*-T3* correspond to treatments T1-T3 in all respects, except
for the recipient not receiving any information about the context and the decision
made by the dictator. The non-informative letter accompanying any money trans-
ferred would only state the following basic information: “You have been selected to
receive x NOK from an economic experiment conducted at the Norwegian School
of Economics (NHH).” Thus, the recipient would not know that the money he re-
ceived reflected a choice made by another person or have any information about the
amount of money actually available in this experiment.10 If extrinsic social motiva-
tion is an important source of motivation in the dictator game, we would expect to
see less sharing in the treatments in which no information was given to the recipient.
Table 1 summarizes the six treatments in the experiment. By comparing treat-
ment T1* to treatments T2*-T3*, we can study whether the introduction of a moral
argument in itself provides motivation for sharing, since in these treatments we
have excluded the possibility that the dictator gives away money because her de-
cision is observed by an anonymous recipient. By comparing treatments T1-T3 to
the corresponding treatments T1*-T3*, we can study whether social concerns moti-
vate sharing in the dictator game, since the only difference across these two sets of
treatments is the information given to the recipient. In particular, we can study the
role of information both in a situation where there is no obvious moral argument for
sharing, by comparing T1 and T1*, and in situations where there clearly are moral
arguments for sharing, by comparing T2-T3 and T2*-T3*.
[ Table 1 about here. ]
selected among the clients in PRIDE TANZANIA in Tanzania (i.e. you), and was asked to decide
how much of his earnings he wanted to give to you. Before he made his choice, he was shown a
copy of this letter. He decided to give you x NOK (equivalent to y USD), which is enclosed to this
letter. If the envelope does not contain any money, however, the participant decided not to give you
any of the money that the two of you had earned.”
10If the dictator decided not to send any money in these treatments, we did not send a letter to the
recipient. This is just an extreme version of the recipient not being given any information about the
context and the dictator’s decision.
8
In the second part of the experiment, to shed some further light on the external
social motive for sharing, we announced that the dictators had the opportunity to
switch to the other information condition.11 Dictators in the treatments T1-T3 were
given the opportunity to choose that no information would be given to the recipi-
ent and dictators in treatments T1*-T3* were given the opportunity to choose that
complete information would be given to the recipient. The dictators were also told
that they could revise their dictator decision if they decided to switch to the other
information condition. Dictators who decided not to switch, were asked the hypo-
thetical question of what they would have transferred to the recipient if they had
been presented with the other information condition initially. If an underlying mo-
tivation for sharing when the decision is observed by a recipient is to reduce guilt
and shame, we would expect some participants in treatments T1-T3 to change to
the no information condition. Correspondingly, if an underlying motivational fac-
tor for sharing in social situations is social esteem and pride, then we should expect
some participants in treatments T1*-T3* to change to the complete information
condition.
In the final part of the experiment, the dictators were asked background ques-
tions about their age, years of business training, gender, political preferences, and
charitable giving. They were, on average, 22 years old, had two years of busi-
ness training, and 35% of them were females. The reported political preferences
show less support for the left-wing coalition government than in the population at
large.12 On charitable giving, 67.5% reported having donated less than 500 NOK
in the previous year, and 32.5% reported having donated 500 NOK or more. By
comparing the share given to self-reported political preferences and charitable do-
nations, we can study whether generous lab behavior is associated with particular
political views or generous behavior outside the lab.
11The announcement was completely unexpected for the dictators, so the introduction of this
possibility could not have affected their initial dictator choices. This is also consistent with the
anonymous comments given by the participants, where no one mentions that they had foreseen this
possibility.
1223.5% reported having voted for the left-wing coalition government in the previous election,
17.5% for centrist parties, 54.5% for right-wing parties, 1.5% for other parties, and 3% did not
respond to this question.
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2 Descriptive statistics
Table 2 reports the average share given in each of the six treatments. Looking first
at the left column, we observe that participants matched with students who have not
worked give away 11.6% when the recipient receives no information (T1*).13 As
shown in Figure 1, a large majority of the participants do not give away anything in
this treatment, and many of them explain this by the absence of a moral argument for
giving. In particular, the participants highlight the absence of an entitlement motive,
“The other participant has not done anything to deserve the money” (participant 20),
but some also mentioned the absence of a needs motive, “[The] other participant
is most likely not in economic need” (participant 103).14 In contrast, only a few
students motivate their choice by reference to selfish considerations, participant 91
being an exception, “I wanted to keep as much as possible myself.” Thus, in this
treatment, most participants seem to find moral and selfish considerations to be
aligned and to justify not giving away anything.
[ Table 2 about here. ]
[ Figure 1 about here. ]
The other two treatments with no information given to the recipient introduce
moral arguments for giving, i.e. entitlements and needs, and in both cases the aver-
age share given increases considerably. When the recipient is another student who
can also be seen as having entitlements to the money that is to be distributed (T2*),
we observe from Table 2 that share given increases to 21%; when the recipient is a
needy microfinance client (T3*), the share given increases to 43.3%. Furthermore,
when comparing T1* and T2* in Figure 1, we observe a substantial decrease in
the share of participants keeping everything for themselves (from 65.7% to 51.5%)
and a corresponding increase in the share of equal splits (from 8.6% to 27.2%).
13This finding is in line with Cherry, Frykblom, and Shogren (2002), who show that dictators
genearlly are unwilling to share when bargaining over money that they have earned themselves.
Our experimental data, however, suggests that this behavior does not reflect selfishness, but rather
the absence of a moral argument for sharing and the presence of a moral entitlement argument for
keeping all the money.
14The explanations are translated from Norwegian.
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The equal splits are, typically, motivated by entitlement considerations, “We have
done the same job and therefore each of us deserves half of the money” (partici-
pant 22). In contrast, the most striking feature when comparing T1* and T3* is
the large increase in the share of participants giving away everything (from 0.3%
to 26.7%), which is explained by reference to the other person being more needy,
“I feel that the person in Tanzania has more need for the money than I have” (par-
ticipant 295).15 In sum, the observed treatment differences and the explanations
of the participants provide evidence of entitlements and needs considerations being
crucial in motivating their behavior, even in situations where the recipient has no
information at all about the context and the choice made by the dictator. Interest-
ingly, in contrast to the baseline treatment, many participants also include selfish
considerations in the explanation of their choice when there is a moral argument for
sharing. This suggests that the dictators in these treatments engage in a trade-off
between moral and selfish considerations when deciding how much to share with
the recipients. The explanation of participant 106, who gave away 50 NOK in T2*,
may serve as an illustration of this line of reasoning, “My choice was based on
selfish reasoning, where I asked myself ‘What do I get out of this?’ Still the other
person has done a job, and deserves some form of reward.”
By comparing the left and right columns in Table 2, we can study the causal
impact of information on the share given. Interestingly, we observe that giving the
recipient information about the context and the dictator’s decision does not increase
the share given in the baseline treatment (T1 versus T1*), 11.6% versus 11.4%,
and the explanation of participant 384 sheds light on why this is the case, “I see
no reason for giving anything to the other person. I am the one who has signed up
for the experiment and I am therefore of the opinion that I deserve all the money.
This I consider fair and I have no problem being open about it.” Thus, as long
as the participants consider it morally unproblematic not to give away money, the
information provided to the recipient appears to be of minor importance.
15This finding is in line with Eckel and Grossman (1996); Jacobsson, Johannesson, and Borgquist
(2007); Konow (2010); Cappelen, Moene, Sørensen, and Tungodden (forthcoming), who also pro-
vide evidence of needs motivating sharing behavior.
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In the treatments where there is a moral argument for sharing, on the other
hand, information appears powerful and increases the average share given: from
21.0% to 29.3% when comparing T2* and T2, and from 43.3% to 60.2% when
comparing T3* and T3. This shows that information provided to an anonymous
recipient matters for dictators, in line with the explanation of participant 236 who
divided equally in T2, “This was the fair division for both participants, i.e., myself
and the other part. The fact that she would know that the money comes from me
strengthens my decision not to take all the money myself,” and by participant 190
in T3, who gave away 75%, “I felt that taking everything for myself would hurt
the person receiving the letter, and it would have been unethical of me since he
or she was in greater need for the money.” Thus, the role of information appears
to interact with the presence of a moral argument for sharing; information only
motivates behavior in the presence of a moral argument.
3 Intrinsic versus extrinsic motivation
Table 3 presents regressions where the dependent variable is the share given by the
dictator. To focus on the relative importance of introducing a moral argument and
information, respectively, we introduce two dummy variables, “Moral” and “Infor-
mation,” where “Moral” takes the value one in the treatments where there is a moral
argument for sharing (T2, T2*,T3, T3*) and “Information” takes the value one in
the treatments where the recipient received complete information (T1,T2,T3).
[ Table 3 about here. ]
Columns 1-3 confirm the impression from the descriptive analysis. The intro-
duction of a moral argument for sharing has in itself a large and significant effect
on the share given, it increases from 11% in the baseline to 38% in the treatments
where there is a moral argument for sharing (p< 0.001, “Moral” in column 1). The
introduction of information also increases the share given, from 24% in the treat-
ments where the recipient receives no information to 32% in the treatments where
the recipient receives complete information (p = 0.096, “Information” in column
2). This effect, however, is completely driven by the treatments where there is a
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moral argument for sharing. As can be seen from column 3, the effect of infor-
mation in the baseline treatment is negligible (p = 0.981, “Information” in col-
umn 3), whereas it is substantial and statistically significant in the moral treatments
(p = 0.053, “Information” + “Moral × Information” in column 3). The estimated
interaction effect “Moral × Information” is almost identical to the effect of infor-
mation in the treatments where there is a moral argument for sharing, but only close
to statistically significant (p = 0.12, “Moral × Information” in column 3). Over-
all, the regressions in columns 1-3 show that intrinsic moral motivation is crucial
for explaining sharing behavior in the dictator game, but also that extrinsic social
motivation creates a crowding-in effect when there is a moral argument for sharing
and the recipient is given information about the context and the decision made by
the dictator.
In column 4, we introduce self-reported background variables, which only
marginally affect the estimated treatment effects. Interestingly, we observe a posi-
tive association between the share given and both charitable giving outside the lab
and political preferences. Participants who report donating 500 NOK or more to
charity the previous year give, on average, 8 percentage points more to the other
participant (p= 0.137, “Charity” in column 4) and participants reporting that they
voted for the left-wing coalition government in the last election give away, on aver-
age, 10 percentage points more (p= 0.078, “Left-wing” in column 4).16 As shown
in column 5, these associations become even stronger when we only consider the
no information treatments (p = 0.046 and p = 0.052, “Charity” and “Left-wing”
in column 5), the charitable and left-wing individuals then give away almost twice
as much as the rest of the participants. This suggests that sharing behavior in the
no information treatments reflects an intrinsic moral motivation that also motivates
charitable giving outside the lab and voting behavior. In the complete information
treatments there is no such association, as observed in column 6.
With respect to age and years of business training, we only find an association
when complete information is given to the recipient. In these treatments, there is
a significant negative association between the share given and years of business
16This finding is in line with Dawes, Johannesson, Lindqvist, Loewen, and O¨stling (2012), who
also find that left-wing individuals are more generous in the dictator game.
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training and a significant positive association between the share given and age (p<
0.001 and p< 0.001, “Business training” and “Age” in column 6). There is no such
association in the no information treatments, which suggests that business training
and age, in opposite directions, significantly affect the extrinsic social motive for
sharing but have no impact on the intrinsic moral motivation. Finally, we observe
that the estimated gender coefficient is small and insignificant in all specifications.
In sum, the regressions in columns 4-6 show that the sharing behavior in the
experiment is associated with behavior outside the lab and personal characteristics,
but also highlights that these associations are sensitive to the presence of extrinsic
social motivation.
4 Opting in and out of information
When introducing the opportunity to switch to the other information condition, we
observe that some dictators prefer the recipient to receive complete information,
whereas others prefer that the recipient receives no information. As shown in Ta-
ble 4, 43.1% of the participants in treatments T1-T3 decide to change to the no
information condition, and 44.9% of the participants in treatments T1*-T3* decide
to change to the complete information condition. In their justifications, the partici-
pants provide a wide range of reasons for their choices, including guilt and shame
among those who decide to go from complete information to no information, and
social esteem and pride among those who decide to go from no information to com-
plete information. A share of the participants also voice the right to privacy as an
argument for changing to the no information condition and the right to information
(on behalf of the receiver) as an argument for changing to the complete information
condition.
[ Table 4 about here. ]
Table 5 shows that the choice of information condition is systematically related
to the share given in all treatments. The participants who decide to change to the
no information condition give, on average, a much lower share than the rest, 21.9%
versus 40.8% (p= 0.004, Mann-Whitney test of equality), whereas the participants
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who decide to change to the complete information condition give, on average, a
much higher share than the rest, 30.2% versus 19.8% (p = 0.104, Mann-Whitney
test of equality). These patterns suggest that different types of extrinsic social moti-
vation are important for understanding behavior in the dictator game. A reasonable
interpretation of the observed patterns is that some of the participants who give
away a small share decide not to inform the recipient in order to avoid feelings of
guilt and shame and some of the participants who give away a large share decide to
inform the recipient to invoke feelings of social esteem and pride.
[ Table 5 about here. ]
Overall, very few of the participants who decide to switch information condition
revise their initial dictator decision, 13.6% in T1-T3 and 11.3% in T1*-T3*, and as
a result the revision in average share given is also marginal, from 21.9% to 20.5%
in T1*-T3* and from 30.2% to 30.8% in T1-T3.17 The fact that so few participants
revise their dictator choices when given the opportunity to do so suggests that the
initial decision has a powerful anchoring effect, which by most participants is jus-
tified by arguing that one should stand by one’s decisions. This is also reflected
in the responses of the participants who do not take the opportunity to change the
information condition. To the hypothetical question of what they would have given
away if they had faced the other information condition initially, these participants
give answers that are very close to what they did in the dictator decision.
5 Conclusion
The present study shows that intrinsic moral motivation is fundamental in explain-
ing dictator game behavior, and that extrinsic social motivation only plays a role
when there is a moral argument for sharing. In these cases, we observe a crowding-
in effect of the extrinsic social motive, where both feelings of guilt and shame and
of social esteem and pride seem to motivate sharing.
17Only 2 out of the 75 dictators who give away a positive share in the treatments T1*-T3* decide
to keep everything for themselves when given the option of switching to no information condition.
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Our findings can shed light on why people in some cases prefer to avoid a shar-
ing situation. It is commonly argued that dictator behavior reflects reluctant sharing,
since many dictators prefer to avoid the sharing situation if given the opportunity
to do so (Dana et al., 2006, 2007; Broberg et al., 2007; Andreoni and Bernheim,
2009; Lazear et al., 2012). For example, Dana et al. (2006) present results from
an experiment where the participants are first asked to share 10 USD in a dictator
game. After making their decision the dictators are offered an exit option where
they receive 9 USD and the recipient stays uninformed and receives nothing. If the
decision in the dictator game solely reflects intrinsic moral motivation, no partici-
pant should choose the exit option, as it is dominated in monetary payoffs by the
dictator game. However, they find that a substantial fraction of the participants exit.
How can this be explained? Our study suggests that this may reflect feelings of
guilt and shame, but also highlights that the decision to exit does not necessarily
reflect a reluctance to share with the recipient. In Dana et al. (2006), the dictator is
only given the choice between sharing (in line with the initial dictator choice, and
in which case the recipient is informed) and not sharing, in which case the recipient
is not informed about the situation. In such a setting, it is not possible to infer how
much of the initial sharing was driven by extrinsic social motivation. In the present
study, we separate these two dimensions, by allowing dictators who prefer not to
inform the recipients to still share with them. Strikingly, we observe very little re-
luctant sharing, most dictators who prefer not to inform the recipient of their choice
nevertheless give away a substantial share of the money.
The present experiment can also shed some light on pro-social behavior outside
the lab. In a novel field experiment on charitable giving in the US, DellaVigna
et al. (2012) show that social pressure is an important determinant of door-to-door
household giving. Some of the patterns observed in this field experiment are in line
with the observed behavior in the present study. First, they find that social pressure
has greater effect for a local charity that is highly valued in the community than
for an out-of-state charity, which corresponds to our finding that extrinsic social
motivation plays a more important role when the dictator perceives that there is a
moral argument for giving. Second, they observe that when a flyer with an opt-
out opportunity is distributed in advance, households who give small donations
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prefer not to open the door, which corresponds to our observation that dictators who
give a small share prefer not to inform the recipient about their generosity. Third,
they observe that the opt-out flyer increases the number of large donations, in line
with what we should expect from the present experiment, where we observe that
some dictators who give away a large share prefer to inform the recipient. This last
point also suggests that the positive utility some people derive from being observed
donating should be taken into account in welfare calculations of charitable door-to-
door campaigns.
Finally, the present experiment highlights the fact that when studying whether
lab behavior is associated with behavior outside the lab, it is important to have a
clear understanding of the motivational forces at play in the experiment. In the
treatments where the recipient is informed, there is no association between gen-
erous behavior in the lab and charitable giving outside the lab. This association
only appears in the treatments that isolate the intrinsic moral motive for giving, in
which we observe that dictators who give away more also report donating more to
charitable organizations. Our design also reveals that intrinsically morally moti-
vated individuals are not necessarily generous in the lab, they are only so if there
is a moral argument for sharing, and even more if there is also an extrinsic social
motive at play. Thus, the interaction between intrinsic moral motivation and extrin-
sic social motivation is essential for understanding moral behavior, both inside and
outside of the lab.
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Figure 1: Distribution of share given
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Note: The panels show, by treatment, the distribution of the share given by the
dictator to the recipient. The treatments are defined in Table 1.
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Table 1: Treatments
Information
Recipient no complete
Student – not working T1* (n=35) T1 (n=36)
Student – working T2* (n=33) T2 (n=34)
Client – needy T3* (n=30) T3 (n=32)
Note: The table presents the six treatments in the study. Recipient refers to the characteris-
tics of the recipient: “Student – not working” means that the recipient was another student
who had not been working, “Student – not working” means that the recipient was another
student who had been working, and “Client – needy” means that the recipient was a micro-
finance client from Tanzania. Information refers to the information condition, where “no”
means that the recipient received no information about the context and decision made by
the dictator and “complete” means that the recipient received complete information about
the context and decision made by the dictator. The number of participants in each treatment
is given by the number in parenthesis.
Table 2: Treatment differences: Share given
Information
Recipient no complete
Student – not working 0.116 0.114
(0.037) (0.034)
Student – working 0.210 0.293
(0.046) (0.055)
Client – needy 0.433 0.602
(0.076) (0.065)
Total 0.245 0.326
(0.033) (0.036)
Note: The table shows average share given by treatment. The treatments are defined in
Table 1. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 3: Regression analysis
All treatments T1*-T3* T1-T3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Moral 0.27∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06)
Information 0.08∗ -0.00 0.02
(0.05) (0.08) (0.07)
Moral×Information 0.13 0.11
(0.09) (0.09)
Charity 0.08∗ 0.17∗∗ 0.03
(0.05) (0.07) (0.07)
Left-wing 0.10∗ 0.16∗∗ 0.06
(0.05) (0.08) (0.07)
Female 0.03 -0.01 0.04
(0.05) (0.07) (0.07)
Age 0.04∗∗∗ 0.00 0.09∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Business training -0.08∗∗∗ -0.03 -0.13∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Constant 0.11∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗ -0.69∗∗ 0.03 -1.45∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.28) (0.39) (0.40)
Information + Moral×Information 0.13∗∗ 0.14∗∗
(0.06) (0.05)
Observations 200 200 200 200 98 102
R2 0.135 0.014 0.157 0.239 0.188 0.334
Note: The table reports regressions where the dependent variable is the share given by the
dictator. Columns (1)-(4) include all observations, column (5) includes all observations
from treatments T1*-T3*, and column (6) includes all observations from treatments T1-
T3. The treatments are defined in Table 1. ’Moral’ is a dummy taking the value one if the
dictator is in the treatments T2, T2*, T3, T3*, ’Information’ is a dummy taking the value
one if the dictator is in the treatments T1-T3, ’Charity’ is a dummy taking the value one if
the dictator has given 500 NOK or more to charitable organizations in the previous year,
’Left-wing’ is a dummy taking the value one if the dictator voted for a party in the left-wing
coalition government in the previous election, ’Female’ is a dummy taking the value one
if the dictator is a female, ’Age’ is the age of the dictator in years, ’Business training’ is
years of business training of the dictator, and ’Information + Moral×Information’ is the
linear combination of Information and Moral×Information. Standard errors in parentheses
(∗ : p< 0.10, ∗∗ : p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ : p< 0.01).
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Table 4: Opting in and out
Choice of information
Treatment no complete
T1 0.472
(0.084)
T1* 0.400
(0.084)
T2 0.411
(0.086)
T2* 0.575
(0.087)
T3 0.406
(0.088)
T3* 0.367
(0.089)
Total 0.431 0.449
(0.049) (0.051)
Note: The table reports, by treatment, the share of individuals that switched to the other in-
formation condition. The treatments are defined in Table 1. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 5: Who opt in and out?
Who opt in and out?
Treatment No switch Choose no information Choose complete information
T1 0.174 0.047
(0.058) (0.024)
T1* 0.088 0.157
(0.049) (0.056)
T2 0.368 0.186
(0.060) (0.099)
T2* 0.161 0.246
(0.056) (0.068)
T3 0.684 0.481
(0.074) (0.115)
T3* 0.347 0.582
(0.089) (0.130)
Total 0.307 0.219 0.302
(0.032) (0.053) (0.053)
Note: The table reports the share given in the distributive choice, by treatment and by the
choice of whether to switch to the other information condition. The treatments are defined
in Table 1. Standard errors in parentheses.
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